Book Review: On Secular Education

On Secular Education, by R.L. Dabney has been a staple text within the Classical and Christian Education movement since its resurgence during the early eighties. Dabney wrote his essay in the 19th century, but much of what he foresaw and forewarned against has since come to pass.

He begins with two questions: who should control education and what is a proper education. Historically, the first question has been answered as either the State or the Church (specifically, the Roman Catholic Church), but Dabney sees each of these institutions as largely unsuccessful. Dabney blames Roman Catholicism for confusing Church education with Christian education, the latter being found only in the Scriptures adjudicated by the rule of truth, guided by (rather than lorded over by) ordained ministers. Ultimately, then, Dabney answers the first question by acknowledging parents as those who should control education, under the guidance of the Church, according to the authority of the Scriptures.

On the State side of the question, Dabney is skeptical of the altruism posed by humanism because it denies the Biblical doctrine of human depravity. Clergymen and secular humanists alike are capable and often tempted to usurp power for selfish ends, and to abandon truth for irrational coercive power. In a State led education, Dabney recognizes that there can be no place for religious authority or instruction, for to give one religion or several sway would pose a power struggle for the others. The State is supreme in its authority and is therefore the institution that must determine all matters of philosophy and theology, to whatever extent it pleases. Moreover, the State cannot function atheistically, and therefore theology cannot be avoided entirely, but will be grounded in the natural theology of the current regime. Dabney gives four possible solutions to the struggle for religious representation, none of which favor Christianity in any Biblically sound fashion.

As for what is a proper education, Dabney recognizes the general requirement that the whole person must be in view and some end or purpose toward which the education drives, as well. The State does not simply claim to provide a skill, but to educate, which touches upon the souls of men, resulting in what Dabney claims is "a general revolt from the Christian faith, even though the country is full of churches, preachers, and a redundant Christian literature" (13). Those words are far reaching and can be confirmed by the most recent Barna polling data to the effect of a majority of children abandoning their faith in college and ceasing church attendance. Because education teaches the soul, it is fundamentally moral. Since God is the only Lord of the conscience, argues Dabney, it is the Lord's obligations that the soul must be taught to know and obey--theology is inseparable from education. Whatever education that denies God and His commands must replace Him with an alternative authority and alternative moral requirements. A contemporary example would be the exaltation of man as the final authority, and the moral requirement to accept every man as autonomous--a law unto himself--free to be whatever he pleases, while being answerable to no other standard. Blasphemy is no longer speaking against God's name, but speaking against those things God abominates, like the murder of infants or the porneia of fornication both heterosexual and homosexual (and perhaps soon to be added, pedophilial and bestial).

Dabney is unwilling to accept that there can be content in education that is taught neither for nor against Christianity. He asks, "Why can't a teacher just present secular subject matter, without maiming either his subject or Christianity?" and answers, "If his teaching is more than dabbling in some corner of education, it will be found to be tacitly anti-Christian. Overt assaults are not made [though many assaults are, in our own day, overt], but there is a studied avoidance which is in effect hostile. There can be no neutral position between these two extremes, which have a 'great gulf fixed' between them." Nor is the supposedly positive moral instruction given in secular education innocuous. Moral obligation requires some justification for the authority by which it is commanded, and the sole justification for moral obligations is the will of God. Any other appeal is teaching the student to ground his motives in some other source, be it his own self-interest, or fear of governmental power, or something else.

Dabney goes on to address several objections to his thesis, but concludes that the present spirit of the age is such that the complete removal of prayers, catechisms, and Bible from schools is but a logical implication of secularized education. Dabney concludes his essay by defending parental authority as that primary earthly authority over the education of children and does his best to distinguish how the powers of Church and State honor the power of the family to accomplish their God-given responsibility.

On the whole Dabney's essay is a trenchant defense of the historic Protestant position and provides a good deal of intellectual fodder for contemporary families who find themselves having to defend their decision to home school or seek our Christian schools rather than choose the cheaper and more socially accepted path of public education. It is also a great book for those who are largely ignorant of the problems of public education in principle, and are willing to have a look.

The Justice of War and the Sixth Commandment

It is often the case that Christian pacifists appeal to the sixth commandment in opposing the justice of waging war. God's prohibition against murder seems as good a place as any in the Bible to go in order to discuss the legitimacy of war, which often, if not always, requires the taking of life in order to wage it.

However, a thorough consideration of the requirements of the sixth commandment not only fails to support pacifist claims against any possibility of just war, they actually oppose such claims in providing the basic justification for waging war.

In the Westminster Larger Catechism, question 135 supplies a clue:

Question 135: What are the duties required in the sixth commandment? 

Answer: The duties required in the sixth commandment are, all careful studies, and lawful endeavors, to preserve the life of ourselves and others by resisting all thoughts and purposes, subduing all passions, and avoiding all occasions, temptations, and practices, which tend to the unjust taking away the life of any; by just defense thereof against violence, patient bearing of the hand of God, quietness of mind, cheerfulness of spirit; a sober use of meat, drink, physic, sleep, labor, and recreations; by charitable thoughts, love, compassion, meekness, gentleness, kindness; peaceable, mild and courteous speeches and behavior; forbearance, readiness to be reconciled, patient bearing and forgiving of injuries, and requiting good for evil; comforting and succoring the distressed, and protecting and defending the innocent.

Notice that the clause about resisting the unjust taking of life is joined to the clause about just defense against violence by the preposition, "by," which in this case most liking is talking about agency, that is, one resists those things that tend toward the unjust taking away of life by means of a just defense against violence.

It does not take long to think of scenarios in which the taking of another's life would be necessary in order to defend the unjust taking of life by that other. With war in particular, the application of the sixth commandment is the protecting of a political community against a hostile opposing political community through defensive response to aggression. Ideally, defensive response would not result in death, but in such cases where death does result from defensive opposition to the unjust taking away of life, then the culpability for that life falls upon the aggressor, not the defensive party.

Consider a very non-aggressive defensive example. Let us say that First City learns of a plan of attack against them by Second City. First City then builds a large wall of defense around their city and gathers supplies and provisions for an immanent siege. Second City marshals its troops and arms and approaches First City to conquer it, unprovoked. First City has no long-range weapons, so they do not attack Second City directly, but bolster their doors and place men with swords at the doors and on the walls. Second City has brought several war devices, including ladders and grappling hooks to scale the wall. In the process of setting up these ladders and hooks, several of Second City's troops do a poor job of setting their ladders and securing their hooks, and they plummet from the wall to their own deaths.

Would any pacifist consider the actions of building the wall around the city to be an unjust act of violence by the First City? Yet such an act is in fact an act of warfare, albeit defensive in nature, since it was in response to the aggressive intention of Second City. First City could have simply sat back and prayed for God's mercy, as opposed to building the wall to protect its citizens. But let us take the example one step further. Let's say that as the ladders and grappling hooks are being set, several of the men of First City unhook the hooks and unhinge the ladders, which leads to the deaths of several soldiers from Second City who plummet to their deaths. Again, the action is defensive--preventing an armed enemy from entering the city by removing his means of entry. The pacifist is probably less likely to agree with this action, the only difference is the amount of agency exerted by the defensive party in preventing the aggressor from harm. The defensive posture of the action is unchanged, as is the object of protection. The men of First City might even yell to their enemies prior to unhinging and unhooking in order to offer their enemies an opportunity to survive.

The main problem with pacifism is that it tends to consider only the life of the aggressor and ignores the life of the party or parties that face the violent threat of the aggressor. Even when the life is one's own, one is responsible to protect that life, for one's own life belongs to God, and not to oneself. To allow a violent aggressor to take one own's life without engaging in a "just defense thereof against violence," is so far from keeping the sixth commandment, but rather is a breaking of it!

Certainly the topic of just war is much more complicated that what I've expressed here, but I'm not attempting to consider the particulars of waging just war, so much as I am interested in showing the basic justice of war, as it is entailed in the sixth commandment. One cannot protect and preserve life without being willing to take away life when the life one must take threatens the life one is seeking to protect and preserve. Ultimately, we must remember that God calls us all to be as He is, a Defender of the weak and defenseless against the mighty who would oppress and kill them unjustly.

Two theological theses worth defending

1. Ontology should be the starting point for Christian education, for it is only insofar as we know what is God and what is man that we can know who is Christ as Lord and Savior.

2. Epistemology should be the starting point for Christian apologetics, for it is only insofar as we can justify our claims to the truth as well as our refutations of error that the unbeliever can be shown foolish, and the wisdom of God be acknowledged as true.

As a student of rhetoric I have a suspicion that one of the chief causes for the differences between Cornelius Van Til and Gordon Clark was in the context and audience of the development of their thought. Van Til taught at a reformed seminary where appeals to the Word of God and the basic knowledge of God were as common and acceptable as tap water. Clark taught for almost three decades in the philosophy department at Butler University, an institution of Christian heritage, but not directly governed by any ecclesiastical authority.

There is a different emphasis when one addresses an audience who is in basic agreement, particularly on a presuppositional level, than when one addresses an audience is in basic opposition. While I don't think this observation minimizes the differences between the two apologists, I do think it helps to explain why they developed their thoughts differently, despite being very close in the actual way in which they refuted opponent arguments.

Van Til wanted to begin with the being of God; Clark with the knowledge of God. Van Til was following the Dutch tradition of the Heidelberg Catechism; Clark was following Calvin and the Westminster Confession of Faith.

I think there is value in both approaches, but I think that audience matters, and thus I would defend the two theses at the top as the preferred approach for a sympathetic and unsympathetic audience, respectively.

"It ain't sexy," or possible reasons Christians don't like Presuppositional Apologetics

I was first introduced to presuppositional apologetics through an online forum where several older, wiser, and honorable Reformed men handed me my hat in several arguments, many of them unrelated to apologetics. As my respect for these men grew, I sought them out for things to read to grow my feeble understanding of theology, and to sharpen my own thinking in general. Three names were mentioned most; Gordon Clark, Greg Bahnsen, and R. J. Rushdoony. The former two were trained philosophers and wrote positive contributions to Christian theology and apologetics as well as defended Christianity against opposing claims. The latter wrote more widely, and (to my knowledge) did not deal specifically with apologetic method in his writings as did Clark and Bahnsen. I've always found these authors to be lucid and compelling, disagreeing with them only on minor points for the most part.

However, I have often encountered folks who find Clark and Bahnsen to be rather unconvincing and underdeveloped in their claims, providing more assertions than arguments. In fact, a friend of mine whose opinion I take seriously commented that he found Bahnsen's "Great Debate" with Gordon Stein to be terrible, mostly because Bahnsen was short on argument and long on assertion. He cited Kelly James Clark, an apologist of the Reformed Epistemology stripe, who made a similar remark about the debate in his response to John Frame's presuppositional position in the Five Views on Apologetics book. Prior to this friend's comments, I had once shown my graduate professor (who was usually pretty even-handed in evaluating arguments) a criticism of Marx, written by Clark, and the professor thought it was an absurd representation of Marx's viewpoint. Finally, in the online forum where I had first encountered these authors, many folks found presuppositional arguments and their proponents to be not only unpersuasive, but something akin to purveyors of cheap parlor tricks--a sort of Christian sophistry, if you will.

While I respectfully disagree with all of these criticisms, I have tried to come up with some plausible reasons why a method I find to be so cogent and pristine in its argument is considered so banal and reprehensible to others. Here's what I've come up with so far:

1. "Presuppositionalism isn't very persuasive to unbelievers, in fact, it doesn't seem to even try to persuade." There is some merit to this criticism, in the sense that presuppositionalism acknowledges that persuading unbelievers to accept Christianity isn't the primary goal of its apologetic. Presuppositionalism is essentially destructive in nature; it seeks to tear down alternatives to Christianity in order to leave the unbeliever "without excuse," or as Bahnsen might say it, to leave the unbeliever in direct confrontation with his own self-deception. Given this negative approach, there is usually less argument devoted to proving positive claims about Christianity. Evidences are not rejected, but neither are they frequently appealed to for support. They are seen as secondary to the destruction of foundational assumptions the inhibit opponents from rightly interpreting evidences, yes, even from accepting evidence as valid. To some this approach seems disingenuous, even unsupportable--isn't one obligated to provide positive arguments for one's own position? However, one must recognize that, with regard to knowing the truth, knowing what is false is also useful. Indeed, knowing something as false entails knowing its contrary, the truth of which is logically entailed. Therefore the presuppositionalist usually only advances one positive claim, the transcendental proof of God's existence, which claims that Christianity is true by the impossibility of the contrary. The apologist then spends the entire debate showing how something that his opponent considers indispensable to his own position is only rationally supportable upon Christian presuppositions. It is a positive argument through negative means. It seems sneaky, but it is just indirect. You can catch a bear by coming at him head-on with a large net, or you can put some fish in a cage with a trap-door.

2. "Presuppositionalism doesn't respond directly to opponents' claims, but just accuses them of being irrational, inconsistent, arbitrary, or incompatible with human experience." Like the first objection, there is some superficial merit to this claim. Presuppositionalism is, by design, an indirect critique of opposing positions. It seeks to provisionally accept the claims of the position it seeks to refute, and then show that contradictions, arbitrary standards, or incompatibilities are logically entailed by its foundational assumptions. Thus, if an empiricist were to say, for example, "How can you, as a Bible-believing Christian, accept that the sun stood still as it is stated in the book of Joshua, when scientifically such an event would be catastrophic for the entire planet?" a presuppositionalist might respond by asking how the empiricist knows that the sun hasn't stopped right now, or how does he know that the sun's stopping now would result in catastrophe. Thus, instead of answering the question, the question is turned back on the opponent, forcing him to justify the grounds of his own objection. The presuppositionalist simply asks, "Can the empiricist's objection stand upon the foundation which the empirist has used to support it?" If it cannot, the force of the objection disappears. While this seems unfair or disingenuous, it is not underhanded at all. Suppose someone accused you of stealing and demanded that you prove your innocence. Would it be unfair for you to ask what grounds the accuser has for his claim that you have stolen? So while an indirect method may be quite unorthodox in terms of how most debates proceed, it is not thereby unfair, disingenuous, or otherwise evasive or unethical. Indeed, the naturalist could with good will and good reason ask the Christian for the grounds of his objections to naturalism. Moreover, as I mentioned in the first objection, the presuppositionalist does use positive claims, but they are usually few and depend upon an indirect method.

3. "Presuppositionalism is a petitio principii, a circular argument fallacy that assumes its conclusion in order to prove its conclusion." There is a sense in which presuppositionalism is circular, however, presuppositionalism makes the claim that all systems of thought are self-referential and therefore circular, but not in a fallacious way. For example, the Christian by his very fact of being so, assumes that God exists--otherwise he would not be Christian. Similarly, the naturalist, by his own convictions, assumes that the world contains no spiritual realities--otherwise he would not be a naturalist. The Christian and the naturalist cannot cease to accept these assumptions without also ceasing to be what they are by conviction. The best either can do is to assume, for the sake of argument, that the opposite of what he believes to be true is true, and see where that would lead--which is precisely what the internal critique of presuppositionalism attempts to do. But even in the assumption of this "unbelief", one is only doing so hypothetically, for otherwise one's convictions would be changed and one would no longer be arguing against the view on behalf of his original position--his own view would have changed. The supposed neutrality of debate is really not neutrality at all, but rather a willingness to follow the logic where it leads whenever one's assumptions are made manifest. Further, the rational approach to being persuaded could only proceed through the destruction of one's accepted assumptions that prevent the change of mind!

4. "Presuppositionalists are only interested in winning the debate, and aren't concerned about presenting the best arguments." I suppose this claim could be true in many cases where presuppositionalists have debated, but I've never been shown how such a tendency is "built into" presuppositionalism--it isn't logically entailed. I think this objection is also related to the method of internal critique used by presuppositionalism. When the presuppositionalist consistently demands that his opponent offer justification for his claims and objections instead of responding to them directly, it can appear that the presuppositionalist is simply trying to "score points" or avoid the difficult arguments of his opponent. Of course, the presuppositionalist maintains that he is very much engaged in proving his case while also answering his opponent's case, but his indirect method of doing so often trips up the opponent and/or the audience because it looks a bit too much like Socrates' gadfly tactics of elenctic argumentation.

5. "Presuppositionalists come across as arrogant, as if they were the only ones with access to truth; that certainty is the only valuable kind of knowledge, thereby disdaining probable arguments." Presuppositionalists believe that God's Word declares knowledge of God to be basic to man, and that God's revealed truth in the Word is irrefutable. If man both knows God, and God's truth is irrefutable, then there is a real sense in which the Christian has "cornered the market on the truth," although the truth about God is possessed by all men in differing degrees. The problem of the unbeliever is not, therefore, predominantly intellectual--a problem of ignorance--but moral; he has only rejected Christianity out of rebellion and consequent self-deception. When ignorance is the problem, instruction in probabilities can be of some use. But when truth is being suppressed, there is little value in relying upon probabilities, since they always afford the possibility of legitimate denial. There is room to persist in rebellion and self-deception. Consider Paul's Areopagus speech in Athens--he does not seek to advance the probability of God's existence or Christ's resurrection. Instead he uses it as the basis of his criticisms of the Greeks' system of belief. One may object to using Paul as a good example of apologetic method, I suppose, but I'm not sure many Christians would take that line. Consider another analogy. If the King of the land sent a proclamation through his many heralds that he had conquered all of his enemies, and that anyone wishing to bow to the King's authority should make public confession and abide in the King's commands, would the heralds use probable arguments to support the fact that the King really had conquered his enemies, or that he really had given the proclamation? Would he not rather insist upon the certainty of the King's reign and rule, and emphasize the peril of those who would be skeptical? When claims of "maximal warrant" are available, why resort to arguments that have less warrant?

There are probably many other criticisms of presuppositionalism, and there are certainly more philosophically challenging critiques, but my main objective has been to address common objections that an audience or newcomer to the method might raise.

Special Revelation in the Garden

Although natural revelation and special revelation are both from God, the latter is like a pair of spectacles (so says Calvin) that helps us to understand everything else. Natural revelation was sufficient before the Fall. And if Adam and Eve had not fallen into sin, it still would be sufficient. The Bible only came about because of the Fall. We can’t see properly unless we put on the spectacles.

The above quote came from Lane Keister in a post concerning the reinstatement of theology as the "queen of the sciences." The reason I bring up this section of his post is because I think it includes one of the continuing difficulties that some Reformed folks have with understanding the nature of man in the Garden of Eden prior to the Fall.

If Natural Revelation (NR) is defined as what God has revealed in Creation, apart from any Divine Word, then it is not true that it was sufficient before the Fall. Why not, you ask? Well, the most important reason is that NR does not provide commandments for men to follow, which means that NR could not provide Adam and Eve with the standards necessary for pleasing God in the Garden. Only God's Law-Word could give Adam and Eve the stipulations or requirements for maintaining their holy and obedient status. This is, in fact, what God provided by commanding Adam and Eve to be fruitful, multiply, and fill the earth; and to subdue it and care for it. It is also what God provided when He prohibited Adam and Eve from partaking of the fruit of the tree in the midst of the garden, lest in eating they transgress and die.

But even if Lane were to qualify his claim so that the pronouncement of Law becomes one exception to the sufficiency of NR in the Garden, he would still suffer from a deficiency. For not only is God's Law-Word required in the Garden, so is His declaration of truth and of blessing. To assume that Adam could intuit from Creation alone all that he was intended to do is to assume that he did not require communion with God in terms of truth and blessing. There is some precedent for thinking that Adam was well equipped to manage Creation on his own. For instance, when God brings the animals to man, the text indicates that Adam named them, but it does not imply that Adam sought out God for knowledge of these names. However, we may wonder how Adam would have been assured that his pronouncements were good and right without God's blessing them and pronouncing them acceptable in His sight. What honorable son does not bring his work before his father for the father's approval? Moreover, how would Adam have known he lacked a counterpart unless God had delivered unto him the animals and given him the task of naming them? God's direction is as much a requirement in the Garden prior to the Fall as it is after the Fall.

As much of a "superman" as Adam may have been, it is obvious that Adam's righteousness and abilities to honor God did not exceed those of Christ, and yet Christ explicitly says that everything He does, He does because it is what His Father has told Him to say or do. In other words, the Divine Word is necessary for the proper functioning of man. Natural Revelation is not sufficient whether prior to the Fall, or after the Fall, to provide man with the proper knowledge he requires to satisfy the Father. And why should it, since the whole purpose of man is to be in communion with God, which certainly implies verbal communication.

So while it is good to affirm with Lane the need for Biblical presuppositions to govern scientific endeavors, it does not require us to accept that Natural Revelation can provide man with the sort of positive knowledge of God that Lane seems to believe it does. Natural Revelation is able to confirm all that Special Revelation provides, and certainly Natural Revelation provides all that is necessary to hold men accountable for their offenses against God. But Natural Revelation is not sufficient for providing man with the knowledge of God that he requires to commune properly with God, in any state of man--whether pre-Fall state, post-Fall state, Redeemed state, or Glorified state.