I had the pleasure of spending a five hour road trip with a Reformed Baptist. As we talked of many things, our differences with regard to the baptism of children arose. Being a paedobaptist, I pointed out to him an inconsistency that helped to change my view from credobaptism when I had been first studying the matter closely. He was, to my surprise, convinced and we spoke of many more examples that supported the basic contention. I thought it might be helpful just to post the basic claim that started the ball rolling. I think one thing that particularly helped our conversation was that we had been listening to Voddie Baucham, a Reformed Baptist who has a very high view of family and of covenantal discipline of children. The stark contrast was made even starker by this background.
I'm going to try and put the argument into a valid form with assumptions laid bare.
1. Being precedes doing.
2. Our being Christian precedes our doing Christianity.
3. God's power alone recreates the being "unbeliever" into the being "Christian" (this is regeneration)
4. Only regenerate beings can do what God commands in willing obedience.
5. The Bible commands elders and fathers to train their children in obedience to God's commands (Deut. 6, 1 Tim. & Titus).
6. The Bible states the God is faithful unto the thousandth generation of children of those who are faithful to His commands (Deut. 7).
7. Given 4-6 children of believing parents must be regarded as Christians in order to consistently fulfill the command of God to disciple them in obedience.
Upon what basis does the father or elder have for believing that his children will be obedient to God's commands? The father or elder is considered disobedient and unfit should his children not obey God's commands, yet it is clear that obedience is only obedience when it comes from the heart, which means a heart that has been made new through regeneration. Since the baptist does not believe that regeneration can occur apart from an understanding, and that the blessings and cursings of the covenant can only be enabled once a profession has been made, there is no basis for the parent of the unbaptized, unprofessing child to expect that their obedience is in accordance with God's commands. Not only is their no basis for expecting genuine obedience, there is no basis for discipleship, since only a regenerate mind can receive the truth of Scripture. In order to be consistent, a Baptist must evangelize, not instruct, and he can only apply the law apart from the gospel promises to his child. But what father who has taught his child to obey his word joyfully expects that the child's joyful obedience to his command is anything but genuine? And is this not obeying the fifth commandment, as a good father is teaching his child to obey, in accordance with Deut. 6? But under the baptist position, all of these efforts are in spite of what the baptist believes his child to be--a fallen, blind, and unregenerate sinner.
While the father cannot know the child's regeneration, he can regard the child as such on the basis of God's stated Word for children of believing parents--a Word that the baptist has rejected the truth of, and cannot claim consistently. The father may raise his child in accordance with Deut. 6 and the elder may be evaluated on the basis of his children's obedience because his children are under the blessings and cursings of the covenant and can be expected to obey from the heart the commands which they are given. And because the paedobaptist has the promise of God that his child shall continue in the obedience in which he is taught, he has a foundation upon which to discipline the child, since God can make known to the child what an unregenerate heart cannot know by definition--namely, that "I am a Christian and must honor my father and mother in the Lord." The baptist child can only be expected to know that "I am an unbeliever and must honor my father and mother by my own standard."
To the extent that baptist elders expect their children to follow in their instruction concerning the Lord's commands in the same way that they expect a newly converted adult to do so, there is also inconsistency. And if the baptist expects the child to obey only superficially, i.e. not from understanding AND willingness, then he is actively training hypocrisy rather than obedience. The only consistently baptist father would treat his child as an unbeliever--continually proclaiming his unbelief and separated status while refraining from the sort of fellowship in which only Christians may participate. Yet what father expects that in raising his child there is not a unity of mind? After all, what is filling the child's mind with propositions to believe and act upon if not the father? What father expects his child to be able to articulate a profession of faith that they believe the father's word is true and should be obeyed? Even Voddie Baucham mentioned a verse in the Old Testament where the daughter's vow to the Lord may be overturned if the father invalidates it--thus the Lord subjects the daughter's vow to the word of the parent, thereby allowing the father to cover the iniquity of the daughter. How else could this be unless children under the headship of the father and mother were sanctified and under the covenant stipulations? What else does Paul mean when saying that a child of even one believing parent is considered holy?
Once one accepts the basic inconsistency of the credobaptist position on this point, one's eyes are opened to see the pervasive assumption regarding the place of children of believing parents in the Covenant of Christ. "Let the little children come unto me," and "Whoever causes the least of these to stumble," are reflective of the ideas laid down in the Old Testament regarding the chosen status of children and the high standard required of parents to be to their children as God is to His children.
Monday, June 20, 2011
Saturday, June 11, 2011
What is rhetoric?
People working in the academic discipline of Rhetoric & Public Affairs occasionally joke about having to explain to their family and friends outside of their profession what it is exactly that they study and or "do." Several answers I've heard are quite straightforward ("I study the history of public address") to those a bit more sophisticated ("I do rhetorical history; I study how speech shapes the progress of cultures and societies") and many variations along the spectrum.
Having studied rhetoric through an undergraduate, masters, and doctorate program (still working on the last) I continue to reflect upon just how "diverse" and sporadic is the field of rhetoric. Many people in the field like it this way, some would prefer more definite boundaries, and others wish for even more diversity and "out of the box" thinking and applications. Of course, for the Christian scholar, there should be a desire and an attempt to integrate rhetoric into its proper relationship to glorifying God.
One of the puritans I've come across in studied for my dissertation sought to relate all of the liberal arts under one overarching philosophy of life, with theology heading them all as the art of living well. Rhetoric was one of the liberal arts, and was defined as the art of speaking ornately, revealing a view of rhetoric as predominantly style, delivery, or eloquence of expression. Dialectic was the art of discoursing well, which essentially meant how to think logically and arrange expression logically. Although some scholar lament taking away from rhetoric the canons of invention, arrangement, and memory (leaving only delivery and style), I think they miss the point of the Ramist approach to the liberal arts, which the Puritans followed (though not always with strict rigidity). It was never Ramus' intent to divorce any one of the liberal arts from the other, but rather to avoid superficial repetitions of content, duplication of methods, and general confusion of terms and their meanings. By streamlining dialectic and rhetoric in the way he did, Ramus was not seeking to take away from rhetoric what was traditionally its own elements, but to organize it in relation to dialectic in such a way that they would operate (with grammar) as true counterparts as Aristotle had originally organized them.
It is true that Ramus and his followers understood dialectic differently than did Aristotle, for while Aristotle distinguished "scientific" discourse (i.e. rigorous logical development from assumed or unquestioned axioms) and "dialectical" discourse (i.e. rigorous logical development from generally believed or well accepted opinions) the Ramist dialectic only sought to consider universal premises that had the status of Aristotle's "scientific" epistemological quality. In other words, opinions had to be argued back to universal and established truths, as opposed to being argued on their own foundations. The perceptive reader will recognize the underlying philosophical assumptions behind these differences. For Aristotle, the epistemological standards were quite different than for Calvinistic Protestants of which Ramus became a convert and whom followed Ramus in his attempts to bring all knowledge and education under the epistemological authority of Christian revelation--the Bible or Word of God and natural revelation as understood through premises set for in that Word.
Rhetoric does not operate apart from dialectic, but rather in coordination with it--in a way not altogether different from Augustine's approach in On Christian Doctrine. In that treatise, Augustine used the tools of rhetoric as a means for interpreting the Scriptures accurately, and then conveying them or arguing them persuasively and clearly to Christians and non-Christian as required. The Puritans allowed the analytical elements of rhetoric to be considered under the head of dialectic, and kept for rhetoric the attention to style, which Augustine treated in book four of his treatise (completed almost a generation after the first three books had been written). Because the truth is given to be discovered in Scripture, the invention and arrangement aspects of rhetoric from the classical approach are more clearly and narrowly circumscribed. One may, but need not, look to human authorities, beautiful literature, or cultural norms to gather materials for persuasion. One needs only to discern what the Scriptures teach and adapt them appropriate to the consciences of the immediate audience. Style and delivery, even for Aristotle, were more closely linked to the psychological considerations of rhetoric--how does this or that rhythm, this or that metaphor, this or that gesture, etc. touch upon, move, or otherwise impact the consciences of the audience? Arguments obviously have this component as well, but on a much more abstract level--since one's first concern is with discerning the truth, or the logical consistency of claims, prior to consideration of how persuasive an audience will find them.
All this is not to say that the Puritans had the right definition and approach to rhetoric. It is open to debate whether or not their divisions accomplished what they hoped for in terms of integrating the liberal arts under theology, or the authority of Scripture. What is of importance for the present concern is that their general philosophy set the agenda for how rhetoric was to be defined. Nothing profound there. What is more interesting, and what will take more time to tease out (my studies remain incomplete and inconclusive) is to what extent proximate aims or emphases (what some rhetorical scholars have called "exigences" and "constraints" of the situation that requires speech for its resolution) remain consistent with the general philosophy, and to what extent their view of rhetoric is affected by, or affects the whole exchange. Does the classical view of Aristotle--that rhetoric is governed by the historical, changing, particular constraints--outweigh the more dialectical approach of the Puritans and later Calvinists I'm studying?
It is a question that may prove uninteresting and fruitless for the larger dissertation, but it does interest me, and aligns with the normative considerations of how we ought to define what is rhetoric.
Having studied rhetoric through an undergraduate, masters, and doctorate program (still working on the last) I continue to reflect upon just how "diverse" and sporadic is the field of rhetoric. Many people in the field like it this way, some would prefer more definite boundaries, and others wish for even more diversity and "out of the box" thinking and applications. Of course, for the Christian scholar, there should be a desire and an attempt to integrate rhetoric into its proper relationship to glorifying God.
One of the puritans I've come across in studied for my dissertation sought to relate all of the liberal arts under one overarching philosophy of life, with theology heading them all as the art of living well. Rhetoric was one of the liberal arts, and was defined as the art of speaking ornately, revealing a view of rhetoric as predominantly style, delivery, or eloquence of expression. Dialectic was the art of discoursing well, which essentially meant how to think logically and arrange expression logically. Although some scholar lament taking away from rhetoric the canons of invention, arrangement, and memory (leaving only delivery and style), I think they miss the point of the Ramist approach to the liberal arts, which the Puritans followed (though not always with strict rigidity). It was never Ramus' intent to divorce any one of the liberal arts from the other, but rather to avoid superficial repetitions of content, duplication of methods, and general confusion of terms and their meanings. By streamlining dialectic and rhetoric in the way he did, Ramus was not seeking to take away from rhetoric what was traditionally its own elements, but to organize it in relation to dialectic in such a way that they would operate (with grammar) as true counterparts as Aristotle had originally organized them.
It is true that Ramus and his followers understood dialectic differently than did Aristotle, for while Aristotle distinguished "scientific" discourse (i.e. rigorous logical development from assumed or unquestioned axioms) and "dialectical" discourse (i.e. rigorous logical development from generally believed or well accepted opinions) the Ramist dialectic only sought to consider universal premises that had the status of Aristotle's "scientific" epistemological quality. In other words, opinions had to be argued back to universal and established truths, as opposed to being argued on their own foundations. The perceptive reader will recognize the underlying philosophical assumptions behind these differences. For Aristotle, the epistemological standards were quite different than for Calvinistic Protestants of which Ramus became a convert and whom followed Ramus in his attempts to bring all knowledge and education under the epistemological authority of Christian revelation--the Bible or Word of God and natural revelation as understood through premises set for in that Word.
Rhetoric does not operate apart from dialectic, but rather in coordination with it--in a way not altogether different from Augustine's approach in On Christian Doctrine. In that treatise, Augustine used the tools of rhetoric as a means for interpreting the Scriptures accurately, and then conveying them or arguing them persuasively and clearly to Christians and non-Christian as required. The Puritans allowed the analytical elements of rhetoric to be considered under the head of dialectic, and kept for rhetoric the attention to style, which Augustine treated in book four of his treatise (completed almost a generation after the first three books had been written). Because the truth is given to be discovered in Scripture, the invention and arrangement aspects of rhetoric from the classical approach are more clearly and narrowly circumscribed. One may, but need not, look to human authorities, beautiful literature, or cultural norms to gather materials for persuasion. One needs only to discern what the Scriptures teach and adapt them appropriate to the consciences of the immediate audience. Style and delivery, even for Aristotle, were more closely linked to the psychological considerations of rhetoric--how does this or that rhythm, this or that metaphor, this or that gesture, etc. touch upon, move, or otherwise impact the consciences of the audience? Arguments obviously have this component as well, but on a much more abstract level--since one's first concern is with discerning the truth, or the logical consistency of claims, prior to consideration of how persuasive an audience will find them.
All this is not to say that the Puritans had the right definition and approach to rhetoric. It is open to debate whether or not their divisions accomplished what they hoped for in terms of integrating the liberal arts under theology, or the authority of Scripture. What is of importance for the present concern is that their general philosophy set the agenda for how rhetoric was to be defined. Nothing profound there. What is more interesting, and what will take more time to tease out (my studies remain incomplete and inconclusive) is to what extent proximate aims or emphases (what some rhetorical scholars have called "exigences" and "constraints" of the situation that requires speech for its resolution) remain consistent with the general philosophy, and to what extent their view of rhetoric is affected by, or affects the whole exchange. Does the classical view of Aristotle--that rhetoric is governed by the historical, changing, particular constraints--outweigh the more dialectical approach of the Puritans and later Calvinists I'm studying?
It is a question that may prove uninteresting and fruitless for the larger dissertation, but it does interest me, and aligns with the normative considerations of how we ought to define what is rhetoric.
Thursday, April 28, 2011
Dabney on Evangelical Inducements
Having found true eloquence to be the soul's virtuous energy exerted through speech, I would remind you that the sermon is a peculiar species of eloquence. Like all other eloquence, it aims always to produce a definite, practical volition in the hearer. This aim is, in the best sense, a worthy one; for the acts it evokes are the spiritual. But its peculiarity is chiefly this, that it applies to the will, the authority of God, the only Lord of the conscience. This alone, I repeat, makes the gospel discourse. Other orators bring to bear upon the understandings of their hearers the force of human testimony and natural reason; they apply to their hearts legitimate secular and moral inducements. The preacher relies alone upon evangelical inducements, and refers every conviction of the reason ultimately to God's testimony. I elaborate this all-important distinction carefully; perhaps my reasons for it are difficult to grasp, because of their simplicity. The end, I repeat, of every oration is to make men do. But the things which the sermon would make men do, are only the things of God. Therefore it must apply to them the authority of God. If your discourse urges the hearer merely with excellent reasons and inducements, natural, ethical, social, legal, political, self-interested, philanthropic, if it does not end by bringing their wills under the direct grasp of a "thus saith the Lord,' it is not a sermon; it has degenerated into a speech.
The emboldened statement is the focus of my interest here, for it implies a presuppositional approach to preaching, namely, that all reasons or testimonies presented to the hearer as support for a claim must ultimately be annexed to or derivative of Scriptural propositions. I am not sure that Dabney has his mind on this point in particular, or that he even recognizes it, for it is possible given the rest of the quote that he separates secular from sacred thinking. However, I suspect that Dabney would acknowledge that even arguments "natural, ethical, social, legal, etc." must be grounded upon Revelation in order to be sustainable for Christian belief and practice, or indeed all sound belief and practice. Whatever the case, the quote is a superb reminder to preachers that whatever arguments or examples they produce in their sermons, they ought to derive them, clothe them, and otherwise immerse them in Biblical presuppositions--and whenever possible, do so by using the Bible's own terms and language.
Tuesday, March 8, 2011
Federal Vision Summarized
A friend of mine, Ron DiGiacomo, posted the following summary on the GreenBaggins website. I haven't found a more concise summary of the chief problem of the Federal Vision:
It expresses precisely what I hoped to have expressed in my previous reviews of Leithart's book, The Baptized Body.
FV is not flawed because it regards the baptized roles as God’s heritage. Rather their error is found in their doctrine of regeneration, which suggests that the non-elect can, for a season, enjoy through water baptism the grace of faith and definitive sanctification prior to falling away. Consequently, FV has no place to ground the assurance of salvation that is available to the regenerate because the system allows for even a reprobate to receive the same measure of regeneration and faith as the elect. (Assurance becomes predicated upon the secret decree of perseverance, which cannot be known being a secret.) All of that stands in stark contrast to the biblical teaching – that the Holy Spirit bears witness only with the true believer’s spirit according to the unambiguous word of promise which states that all who God calls, He justifies and will glorify.
It expresses precisely what I hoped to have expressed in my previous reviews of Leithart's book, The Baptized Body.
Saturday, January 8, 2011
Time & Eternity
Time is the succession of thoughts in the mind of rational, created beings. God, being eternal, does not have a succession of thoughts, but rather His thoughts persist at once in their entirety, or put otherwise, they are immediate. God "interacts" with time insofar as every action of creation (including the succession of men's thoughts) is the result of God's thinking them so. Therefore time is an aspect of the created order and not an aspect of God's essential nature. Therefore time is subject to the will of God, and not God to the nature of time. (HT Aurelius Augustine, Gordon Clark)
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